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Abstract 
Deliberative practices have been suggested as a way to increase involvement in political decision 
making, although it is unclear whether such practices appeal to all segments of society. For this reason, 
we examine the links between support for deliberative practices and two dimensions of ideological 
predispositions: left-right ideology and nationalism-cosmopolitanism. Analyses based on data from 
the 2015 Finnish National Election Study (FNES2015) with 1602 respondents, demonstrate that 
citizens with leftist and cosmopolitan predispositions are more supportive of deliberative practices. 
Furthermore, political awareness moderates the impact of the left-right ideological dimension, 
suggesting that individuals who are politically aware are better equipped to convert their left-right 
predispositions into opinions towards deliberative practices. 
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The introduction of deliberative practices has been proposed as a method for revitalizing 
representative democracies suffering from decreasing political involvement and increasing 
fragmentation (Dryzek, 2000; Grönlund, Bächtiger, & Setälä, 2014; Parkinson & Mansbridge, 2012). 
Some scholars, however, question whether citizens are willing to engage in deliberative practices 
(Bartels, 2003; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002; Posner, 2004). A related concern is that deliberative 
practices may not appeal equally to all groups of citizens, and consequently jeopardize the principle 
of inclusion of all relevant arguments and experiences in deliberation (Young, 2000).  
Whether deliberative practices can help revitalize democracy partly depends on the extent to 
which support for these practices is related to ideological predispositions. Previous studies suggest 
that ideological predispositions systematically influence individual attitudes toward public 
involvement in political processes (Bengtsson & Mattila, 2009; Dalton & Welzel, 2014; Inglehart, 1997; 
Kriesi, 2010). If a corresponding pattern were to be found for deliberative practices, the result could 
be detrimental to the deliberative focus on inclusiveness. An ideological bias among supporters might 
translate into overrepresentation of certain ideological perspectives in deliberative events. 
Furthermore, if support for deliberative practices depends on strong ideological predispositions, the 
prospective participants in deliberation are likely to behave like activists—eager to pursue their 
established goals by any means necessary (Mackuen, Wolak, Keele, & Marcus, 2010, p. 440)—rather 
than deliberative citizens, who are considerate, balanced, open-minded, and willing to compromise 
(Levine & Nierras, 2007; Mackuen et al., 2010). If the composition of deliberative events is 
ideologically unrepresentative, it can also result in harmful group composition effects that affect the 
final outcome (Baek, Wojcieszak, & Delli Carpini, 2012; Barabas, 2004; Gastil, Black, & Moscovitz, 
2008). It is therefore important to establish how ideological predispositions shape attitudes toward 
the use of deliberative practices in society. 
Based on these considerations, we aim to study how support for deliberative practices is linked 
to ideological predispositions on the traditional left-right dimension and the nationalist-cosmopolitan 
values dimension. Jacobs, Cook, & Delli Carpini (2009) and Neblo, Esterling, Kennedy, Lazer, & Sokhey 
(2010) constitute a couple of pioneering studies that examine the willingness to deliberate in the US, 
and show that politically marginalized groups are willing to deliberate (Neblo et al. 2010), and that 
self-identified liberals are more likely to engage in deliberation than people who consider themselves 
to be more conservatives (Jacobs et al. 2009). However, these studies are not necessarily applicable 
outside the American context. Moreover, Jacobs et al. (2009) restrict their analysis to a one-
dimensional conceptualization of ideology that fails to capture contemporary ideological richness.  
We use the Finnish National Election Study from 2015 (FNES2015) to demonstrate that 
individuals who are left-leaning and/or adhere to cosmopolitan values support deliberative practices. 
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In line with the work of Zaller (1992), we also find that political awareness furthers the ability to 
formulate opinions that are consistent with ideological predispositions. 
Deliberation and Ideological Predispositions 
Important distinctions can be made between different theories of deliberative democracy 
(Bächtiger, Niemeyer, Neblo, Steenbergen, & Steiner, 2010), but they share an emphasis on 
discussions as prerequisites for enlightened political decision-making. In this study, we use the 
concept of deliberative practices to refer to a broad range of measures aiming to improve the 
deliberative capacity of political systems by promoting discussions and exchanges of arguments in 
society (Parkinson & Mansbridge, 2012). There are various kinds of public discussions, some of which 
fail to fulfil the most stringent definitions of deliberation (Levine & Nierras, 2007; Karpowitz & 
Mendelberg, 2007). Nevertheless, we here employ a broad definition of deliberation since the aim is 
to include all processes that may enhance the deliberative capacity of political systems, even when 
they do not completely adhere to the ideal of deliberation.1 
Successful deliberation ideally should include all relevant arguments and opinions, and be a 
formative process (Goodin, 2004; Mansbridge et al., 2010; Parkinson, 2006). In order to ensure that 
all relevant positions and perspectives are included, the ideological predispositions of participants in 
deliberative practices ought to reflect the ideological composition of society (Gastil 2008; Gastil et al., 
2008; Young, 2000). It is however questionable whether deliberative practices appeal to all segments 
of society, especially when it comes to the ideological predispositions of presumptive supporters.  
From a theoretical perspective, deliberation has been accused of harbouring an elitist notion of 
democracy that does not appeal to common people, and of promoting liberal values over more 
conservative ones (Blattberg 2003; Parvin, 2015). Empirical evidence also suggests that ideological 
predispositions affect support for deliberative practices. First, it is well-established that politically 
right-leaning individuals are more conservative when it comes to institutional changes (Anderson & 
Singer, 2008, p. 574). Although deliberation may help preserve the status quo by blocking drastic 
political reforms, those on the right may consequently oppose such novel methods of decision making. 
Furthermore, previous studies have found that people are generally consistent in their preferences of 
decision-making procedures (Bengtsson & Christensen, 2016; Bengtsson & Mattila, 2009; Font, 
Wojcieszak, & Navarro, 2015). Some studies even suggest that leftists show stronger support for 
participatory and direct democratic processes (Bengtsson & Mattila, 2009; Esaiasson, Gilljam, & 
Persson, 2010), and they may likewise be more inclined towards deliberative practices.  
Second, the progression of what has been termed postmodernist, libertarian or cosmopolitan 
values in Western democracies is tied to support for participatory reforms (Dalton & Welzel, 2014; 
Inglehart, 1997; Kriesi, 2010). According to Inglehart (1977, 1997), post-materialist generations crave 
innovative forms of political participation to complement the traditional representative structures.  
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Third, studies on deliberation show that certain ideological positions dominate deliberative 
events. Jacobs et al. (2009, p. 53) found that liberals are more likely than conservatives to engage in 
deliberation, and a study of recruitment to a deliberative mini-public shows that attrition is higher 
among citizens with anti-immigration attitudes (Karjalainen & Rapeli, 2015).2 
Political ideology, as we use the term here, departs from dominant issue divides with political 
relevance (Bartolini, 2011; Deegan-Krause, 2007). Traditionally, ideology has been considered a one-
dimensional phenomenon distributed on a left-right continuum (Downs, 1957), which in a European 
context has its roots in historical class cleavages (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Knutsen, 2006) that divided 
politics into the liberal-conservative right and the social-democratic or socialist left. Although this left-
right dimension has largely revolved around issues of redistribution, over time it has developed into a 
meta-dimension that has structured party systems and the ideological beliefs of citizens (Mair, 2007). 
However, several works contend that ideology can no longer be considered one-dimensional, 
and that a dimension concerning immaterial values rather than issues of redistribution has 
complemented the left-right dimension. Scholars here use various labels to denote the poles on 
closely related value dimensions, such as libertarian/authoritarian (Flanagan & Lee, 2003; Kitschelt, 
1994, 1995), post-materialist/materialist (Inglehart, 1977), green-alternative-libertarian 
(GAL)/traditional-authoritarian-nationalist (TAN) (Hooghe, Marks, & Wilson, 2002) or 
cosmopolitans/nationalists (Norris & Inglehart, 2009).3  Despite the different labels and empirical 
operationalizations, these scholars share a belief that when examining the causes and consequences 
of ideological predispositions, it should be acknowledged that ideology today is a multi-dimensional 
phenomenon. For this reason, we also examine the relationship between the dimension that we label 
national-cosmopolitan values and support for deliberative practices. 
The theoretical and empirical reasons presented above suggest that ideological predispositions 
on both dimensions are likely to influence attitudes towards deliberative practices, since individuals 
with more leftist and/or cosmopolitan values are likely to support the introduction of such 
mechanisms to complement representative decision making. These suggestions are in line with the 
established finding that general political predispositions function as guides or heuristic devices when 
people structure their views on more specific issues (Feldman & Zaller, 1992; Goren, Schoen, Reifler, 
Scotto, & Shittick, 2016; Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock, 1991). However, the impact of these 
predispositions may be less straightforward than suggested above. As convincingly demonstrated by 
Zaller (1992), people need a certain level of political awareness (attention and understanding) in order 
to translate their ideological predispositions into opinions on specific issues.4 Politically aware citizens 
are more likely to organize their political ideas in an ideologically consistent manner5 (Gastil & Dillard, 
1999), that is, they are more likely to hold political beliefs that are in line with their ideological 
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predispositions. This implies that it is among the politically aware that we would expect to find a 
stronger link between ideological predispositions and attitudes towards deliberative practices. 
Based on these considerations, we examine the following hypotheses on the relationship 
between ideological predispositions and support for deliberative practices in the empirical section: 
H1. Leftist values on the traditional left-right dimension are positively associated with 
positive attitudes towards deliberative practices. 
H2. Cosmopolitan values on the nationalist-cosmopolitan dimension are positively 
associated with positive attitudes towards deliberative practices. 
H3. Political awareness moderates the relationship between ideological predispositions and 
attitudes towards deliberative practices. 
Data and Operationalizations 
The data come from the Finnish National Election Study conducted following the national 
elections on 19 April 2015 (FNES2015), which involved a cross-sectional survey using a two-stage 
process with introductory face-to-face interviews of 1,602 respondents during April-June 2015. 6 
Although the cross-sectional data do not make it possible to settle causal effects, FNES2015 is ideal 
for examining associations between ideological predispositions and support for deliberative practices 
since the survey includes suitable measures for all variables.  
Finland constitutes an opportune case since, like most European democracies, it has an 
established tradition of representative decision making complemented by a restrictive use of 
consultative referendums. However, studies show demand for more citizen involvement in political 
decision making (Bengtsson & Christensen, 2016), echoing similar sentiments across the continent. In 
this sense, even though the generalizability of the results may be limited, Finland presents a 
paradigmatic case for studying attitudes towards deliberative practices. The general public has a 
limited familiarity with formal deliberative institutions such as deliberative mini-publics.7 However, 
this does not preclude the public from forming opinions on the presumptive use of deliberative 
practices in the form of public discussions to complement representative decision making. 
All variables are coded to vary between 0 and 1, with 1 indicating the highest value of the 
variable in question. More information on the coding of variables, and descriptive statistics, is found 
in Appendix 1.  
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the attitude towards the use of deliberative practices as a 
complement to representative decision making. 8  The measure is based on responses to two 
statements: 1) Political discussions for ordinary citizens should be arranged in support of 
representative democracy, and 2) I myself would like to participate in political discussions arranged for 
ordinary citizens. The responses to both items were indicated using a 4-point Likert scale (totally 
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agree–totally disagree), and these scores were subsequently combined to form an additive index (M= 
.53). A closer inspection of the individual questions (not shown) reveals that about 75% tend to agree 
that discussions should be arranged to support representative democracy, while only about 42% are 
willing to take part in them.9  
Our operationalization is based on a broad conceptualization of deliberative practices in line 
with the definition offered above, and may therefore overestimate the extent of support for a more 
narrowly defined interpretation. Some may even object to the label deliberative practices since the 
questions do not refer to genuine deliberative institutions such as mini-publics (Grönlund et al., 2014). 
However, since most people are unfamiliar with these formal deliberative institutions, it makes little 
sense to ask respondents about their attitudes towards them directly. Previous survey research on 
how citizens see public deliberation has also relied on similarly wide understandings of the topic (Baek 
et al., 2012; Wojcieszak, Baek, & Delli Carpini, 2009).  
A broad conceptualization is warranted in this case, as the objective is not to identify support 
for specific arrangements (i.e., mini-publics), but to examine support for the use of talk-centric 
measures to improve representative decision making. Our conceptualization is closer to what 
Bächtiger et al. (2010) entitle Type II deliberation, which involves more flexible discourses than the 
more narrowly defined Type I deliberation, which focuses on rational discourse and procedural 
aspects. Nevertheless, our operationalization entails a focus on discussions that are connected to 
formal political decision making in line with Levine & Nierras (2007).  
Independent Variables 
To capture ideological predispositions, we focused on the traditional left-right dimension (Mair, 
2007) and the increasingly important dimension of what we here refer to as nationalist-cosmopolitan 
values. The position on the left-right dimension was measured with a variable, where the respondent 
indicated his or her placement on an 11-point left-right scale (recoded to vary between 0-1 (1=right). 
The degree of national-cosmopolitan values was captured with an index based on three questions 
measuring the attitudes of the respondents towards multiculturalism in general and tolerance 
towards two out-groups: sexual minorities and immigrants (Cronbach’s alpha=.76, 1=cosmopolitan) 
10. 
Moderator Variables 
Political awareness is conceptualized as the understanding of and attentiveness towards 
politics, and operationalized by two different variables. The first is factual political knowledge, which 
is in accordance with the operationalization used by Zaller (1992). This was measured with an index, 
where respondents received a point for each correct answer to five factual questions on international 
and domestic Finnish political matters (0=no correct answers). The second variable is political interest, 
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which has been considered a suitable indicator (Zaller, 1992, pp. 333–4) and has been used in previous 
research on similar topics (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). We measured this with a common 
question on the topic, where respondents indicated how interested they were in politics on a 4-point 
scale (0=lowest interest). 
Control Variables 
To ascertain the robustness of the results, we included socio-demographic characteristics (age, 
gender, education and full-time employment) and attitudes towards the political system (satisfaction 
with democracy, political trust, and internal and external political efficacy). All of these variables have 
been demonstrated to influence the propensity for political participation in general (Bengtsson & 
Christensen, 2016; Verba et al., 1995) and in regard to deliberation (Karjalainen & Rapeli, 2015; Neblo 
et al., 2010). 
Age in years was divided by 100 to approximate the 0–1 coding of all independent variables. In 
regard to education, the respondents indicated the highest level of education completed on an 8-
point scale (0=lowest level of education). The other two characteristics are dichotomous. For gender, 
0 indicates female and 1 male, whereas for employment, 1 corresponds to full-time employment, and 
all other occupations (student, retired, half-time employment etc.) are coded 0. For satisfaction with 
democracy, respondents indicated their extent of satisfaction with how democracy functions in 
Finland on a 4-point scale (0=lowest satisfaction). We measured internal political efficacy with a 
question, where respondents indicated the extent to which they agree with the statement, 
“Sometimes politics seems so complicated that I can’t really understand what is going on,” on a 4-
point Likert scale (0=lowest efficacy). External efficacy was measured with an index based on four 
statements, where respondents indicated their views on the responsiveness of the political system on 
a 4-point Likert scale (0=lowest efficacy ; Cronbach’s alpha = .77). For political trust, we use an index 
based on five questions, where respondents indicated their level of trust on an 11-point scale (0–10) 
in regard to the Finnish parliament, politicians, political parties, the Finnish president, and the 
government (Cronbach’s alpha=.91).  
Methods of Analysis 
A Shapiro-Wilk test shows that the dependent variable follows a normal distribution since the 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected (W=0.998; p=.0812). We therefore used linear regression with 
robust standard errors to examine our hypotheses. To examine H1 and H2 concerning the associations 
between ideological factors and support for deliberative practices, the first model, M1, only included 
the two ideological factors, left-right and nationalist-cosmopolitan, whereas M2 also included the 
measures of political awareness and control variables to verify that the linkages persist when 
controlling for other factors.  
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To examine H3 and the moderating effect of political awareness, in M3, we included four 
interaction terms constituted by the two ideological factors and the two factors of political awareness 
in the regression model.  
Empirical Analysis 
Table 1 displays the results of the regression analyses.  
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
M1 shows that both ideological variables have the expected relationships with support for 
deliberative practices, which is also the case for M2 after controlling for other variables. For the left-
right dimension, the negative coefficient of -0.21 in M2 (p<.001) shows that being to the left on this 
ideological dimension is associated with stronger support for deliberative practices. For the 
nationalist-cosmopolitan dimension, the positive coefficient of 0.12 (p=.002) shows that a higher 
degree of cosmopolitanism is associated with stronger support for deliberative practices. Figures 1a 
and 1b show what this entails for the associations between ideological factors and support for 
deliberative practices when holding all other factors at their mean values. 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
For the left-right dimension, the predicted value of support for deliberative practices is about 
0.66 for those furthest to the left, but this decreases to about 0.45 for the most extreme rightist 
respondents. For the nationalist-cosmopolitan dimension, the most nationalist respondents have a 
predicted level of support of about 0.47, which increases to 0.59 for the respondents with the most 
cosmopolitan values. This supports H1 and H2, since both ideological variables have the expected 
associations with level of support for using deliberative practices. 
M3 shows that there are no significant effects for the nationalist-cosmopolitan dimension. 
There is, however, a significant interaction effect between the left-right dimension and political 
interest and the interaction effect between the left-right dimension and political knowledge is 
marginally insignificant (B=-0.25, p=.072). Since traditional significance tests are unreliable for 
establishing the substantial importance of interaction effects, we show the implications of both of 
these in Figure 2 (Bedeian & Mossholder, 1994; Brambor, Clark, & Golder, 2006).11 To allow for a 
comprehensive examination of what the plots signify, we included both marginal effects of left-right 
ideology depending on political awareness and developments in predicted support for deliberative 
practices for those furthest to the left and those furthest to the right.  
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FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The substantive interpretations were similar regardless of whether we measured political 
awareness with political interest or political knowledge. At lower levels of political awareness, the 
associations between the left-right dimension and support for deliberative practices are negligible, 
but they strengthen when respondents become politically aware. Hence leftist individuals are only 
supportive of deliberative practices when they also pay attention to what happens in politics. 
The results thereby partly support H3 since the associations between the left-right dimension 
and support for deliberative practices depend on the level of political awareness, whereas there are 
no moderating effects for the nationalist-cosmopolitan dimension. 
Implications of Results 
The main finding presented here is that support for deliberative practices is higher among 
individuals with leftist and/or cosmopolitan values. If this support were to be reflected in actual 
participation, it would challenge the inclusiveness of deliberative practices emphasized by several 
deliberative theorists (Mansbridge et al., 2010; Parkinson, 2006; Young, 2000).12 When deliberative 
practices mainly attract participants who hold certain ideological positions, the result can undermine 
both the quality and legitimacy of the output of deliberative practices (Dryzek, 2000; Goodin, 2004; 
James, 2008).  
Our findings support previous studies that also found ideological predispositions to be 
associated with positive attitudes towards participatory mechanisms in general (Bengtsson & Mattila, 
2009; Dalton & Welzel, 2014; Inglehart, 1997) and deliberative practices in particular (Jacobs et al., 
2009). The results thus support the notion that those with leftist/cosmopolitan values favour 
participatory political processes, albeit other mechanisms specifically related to the deliberative 
character of the processes under scrutiny may also be in play. Some studies suggest that issues 
traditionally associated with the right or nationalism are considered less amenable to public scrutiny 
(Gastil et al., 2010, pp. 4-5), causing individuals who agree with these issues from the outset to be less 
likely to support the use of deliberative practices.  
There is therefore a need to ensure that less popular, and maybe even more controversial, 
viewpoints are represented during prospective deliberative events. This is especially the case since 
previous studies suggest that group composition affects developments in attitudes during deliberation 
(Gastil et al., 2008; Karpowitz & Mendelberg, 2007). When participants tend to hold similar ideological 
predispositions, it is less likely that they are exposed to different ideological perspectives, which some 
studies suggest is a prerequisite for genuine deliberation (Barabas, 2004). It becomes more likely that 
participants act as activists rather than deliberative citizens (Levine & Nierras, 2007; Mackuen et al., 
2010), which may ultimately undermine the legitimacy of such events.  
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We have also demonstrated that the link between left-right values and support for deliberation 
is stronger among the politically aware. A greater understanding of, and attentiveness towards, 
politics hence furthers the ability to formulate opinions that are consistent with ideological 
predispositions (Zaller, 1992). This finding supports the appeal made by Zaller (1992, pp. 308-309), 
that it is important for researchers to consider that people can vary greatly in their abilities to act on 
their values and interests. In this case, this entails that individuals with low political awareness may 
not articulate the attitude towards deliberative practices that their ideological predispositions would 
suggest.  
In connection to this, it is noteworthy that political awareness only moderated the relationship 
between the traditional left-right ideological dimension and support for deliberative practices. 
Although the implications of this are unclear, it shows that the new ideological dimension emphasizing 
cultural perspectives has a more straightforward relationship with support for deliberative practices, 
even for those with low levels of political awareness. It is, however, possible that this finding is due to 
the character of the operationalization of this ideological dimension. Whereas an established measure 
exists for the left-right dimension, for measuring the position on the nationalist-cosmopolitan 
dimension we had to rely on issue positions in the form of attitudes towards various out-groups. 
Although common in the literature, it is possible that this approach leads people to think about specific 
interactions with the mentioned groups, rather than the abstract ideological principles that are of 
central concern here. This suggests a need to develop a measure of this cultural dimension that is 
equivalent to the left-right self-placement variable.   
These findings do not come without limitations. Although the Finnish case is instructive, it 
cannot be ascertained that similar findings would be found in other settings. Furthermore, it is worth 
reiterating that these findings do not necessarily entail support for specific deliberative institutions 
such as mini-publics, since our aim here was to examine support for a broader notion of deliberative 
practices. In order to assess whether similar results could be obtained in other contexts and for other 
practices, more research is needed.  
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Endnotes 
1 Contrary to others (Christensen, Himmelroos, & Grönlund, 2017; Jacobs et al., 2009), we do not use the 
term discursive practices to stress that the discussions should involve more than “just talk”, i.e., they should be 
connected to existing political processes and, at least potentially, affect their outcomes, which is in line with the 
systemic approach to deliberation (Parkinson and Mansbridge, 2012). Our approach corresponds to the focus of 
Levine & Nierras (2007) on public deliberation that aims to resolve real problems. 
2 Moreover, Gastil, Bacci, & Dollinger (2010) find that outcomes of deliberation tend to be biased towards 
cosmopolitan and collectivist beliefs. 
3  Other examples of labels used are self-expression/survival (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005), libertarian, 
universalistic/traditionalist-communitarian (Bornschier, 2010), integration/demarcation (Kriesi, 2010).  
4 We would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this suggestion. 
5 Or to have “politically sophisticated” belief systems (Luskin, 1987).  
6 See https://services.fsd.uta.fi/catalogue/FSD3067?lang=en&study_language=en for more information 
on FNES2015. 
7 Deliberative mini-publics have mainly been used in the form of academic experiments in Finland. 
8 We use the same measure as Christensen et al. (2017), who study whether participation in a deliberative 
mini-public enhances support for arranging public discussions in representative democracy. 
9 We fitted ordinal regression models examining the ideological impact on the separate questions. The 
associations with the ideological predispositions were generally similar with the exception that the direct effect 
of cosmopolitanism is not significant (B=0.55, p=.084) for the question on introducing political discussions for 
ordinary citizens. 
10  One of the items included in our index concerns the rights of sexual minorities rather than 
cosmopolitan/nationalist values, but this has been shown to correlate strongly with similar dimensions 
(Inglehart, 1997). 
11 The exclusion of the remaining non-significant interaction effects is also warranted by their weak 
coefficients (see M3), meaning their substantial impact is in any case limited. Even if we run separate analyses 
for all interaction effects, the two non-significant interaction terms do not gain significance and the substantive 
impacts remain limited. We therefore remain confident that the two effects we focus upon are the most 
relevant. 
12 Even if the results for our control variables suggest there are few significant differences in terms of 
socio-demographic characteristics, suggesting that support for deliberative practices is fairly egalitarian in terms 
of descriptive representation (James, 2008). 
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List of Tables and Figures 
Table 1  
Multivariate linear regression models examining support for deliberative practices 
 M1 M2 M3 
 Coef. Robust SE P Coef. Robust SE P Coef. Robust SE P 
Independent variables          
Left-right -0.22 (0.04) 0.000 -0.21 (0.04) 0.000 0.12 (0.10) 0.235 
Nationalist-cosmopolitan 0.15 (0.04) 0.000 0.12 (0.04) 0.002 0.15 (0.13) 0.230 
Political awareness          
Political knowledge    -0.02 (0.03) 0.428 0.14 (0.12) 0.245 
Political interest    0.39 (0.03) 0.000 0.53 (0.11) 0.000 
Interactions          
Political knowledge x left-right        -0.24 (0.13) 0.072 
Political interest x left-right        -0.25 (0.12) 0.042 
Political knowledge x Nationalist-
cosmopolitan       -0.06 (0.15) 0.693 
Political interest x Nationalist-
cosmopolitan       0.00 (0.14) 0.977 
Control variables          
Age/100    -0.09 (0.05) 0.047 -0.10 (0.05) 0.026 
Gender (1=Male)    -0.03 (0.02) 0.066 -0.03 (0.02) 0.093 
Education    -0.06 (0.03) 0.102 -0.05 (0.03) 0.117 
Full time employment (1=Yes)    -0.01 (0.02) 0.376 -0.02 (0.02) 0.300 
Satisfaction with democracy    -0.05 (0.05) 0.288 -0.05 (0.05) 0.269 
Internal efficacy    -0.07 (0.03) 0.009 -0.08 (0.03) 0.006 
External efficacy    0.07 (0.04) 0.135 0.07 (0.04) 0.117 
Political trust    -0.09 (0.06) 0.118 -0.09 (0.06) 0.112 
Constant 0.58 (0.03) 0.000 0.53 (0.05) 0.000 0.33 (0.09) 0.000 
F  (2,1292)=31.25, p<0.001 (12,1201)=28.41, p<0.001 (16,1197)=24.21, p<0.001 
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.19 0.19 
N 1295 1214 1214 
Note: Entries are coefficients from linear regression analyses with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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APPENDIX  
Coding of variables and descriptive statistics 
Variable Coding N Mean SE Min Max VIF 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE       
Q1 Political discussions for ordinary citizens should be arranged 
in support of representative democracy; answer on 4-point 
scale (0=Totally disagree) 
1502 1.94 0.83 0.00 3.00 N/A 
Q2 I myself would like to participate in political discussions 
arranged for ordinary citizens; answer on 4-point scale 
(0=Totally disagree) 
1530 1.21 1.05 0.00 3.00 N/A 
Support deliberative 
practices 
Additive index based on Q1 and Q2 coded to vary between 
0 and 1 (1=highest extent of support). 
1469 0.53 0.27 0.00 1.00 N/A 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES       
Left-right dimension Where would you place yourself on a scale where 0 stands for 
left and 10 stands for right?; coded to vary between 0 and 1 
(1=Right).  
1388 0.56 0.21 0.00 1.00 1.13 
Nationalist-cosmopolitan 
dimension 
Index based on answers to three proposals concerning the 
future of Finland: 1) A multicultural Finland where people 
are tolerant towards people from other countries; 2) A 
Finland where the rights of sexual minorities are 
strengthened; 3) A Finland with more immigration. All 
responses 0–10 (10=very good proposal). Index coded to 
vary between 0 and 1 (1=Cosmopolitan; Cronbach’s 
alpha=0.76). 
1587 0.56 0.22 0.00 1.00 1.16 
POLITICAL AWARENESS (MODERATOR VARIABLES)       
Political knowledge Number of correct answers to 5 factual questions on 
political matters; coded to vary between 0 and 1 (1=5 
correct). 
1587 0.57 0.28 0.00 1.00 1.27 
Political interest How interested are you in politics? Answer on four-graded 
scale coded to vary between 0 and 1 (1=Very interested) 
1587 0.61 0.29 0.00 1.00 1.31 
CONTROL VARIABLES       
Age 2015-Birth year, divided by 100 1587 0.51 0.20 0.18 0.94 1.31 
Gender Respondent’s gender; 0=female, 1=male. 1587 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.08 
Education What is your highest educational attainment? Answer on 7-
graded scale coded to vary between 0 and 1 (1 highest 
educational attainment). 
1583 0.47 0.26 0.00 1.00 1.37 
Employment Which of the following options best describes your life 
situation? Answer included 12 possibilities, coded 
dichotomously with 1=full-time employment (at least 32 
hours per week), 0=anything else. 
1587 0.32 0.46 0.00 1.00 1.16 
Satisfaction w. democracy How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in 
Finland? Answer on four-graded scale coded to vary 
between 0 and 1 (1=completely satisfied). 
1568 0.60 0.19 0.00 1.00 1.18 
Internal political efficacy Sometimes politics is so complicated that I don’t really 
understand what is going on. Answer on four-graded scale 
coded to vary between 0 and 1 (1= disagree completely). 
1553 0.36 0.32 0.00 1.00 1.24 
External political efficacy Index based on extent of agreement to 4 questions: 1) 
Politicians don’t care about the opinions of ordinary people; 
2) I cannot influence what the country’s government and 
parliament decide; 3) Parties are only interested in peoples’ 
votes, not their opinions; 4) It does not matter what parties 
are in government, the policies still do not change. All 
answers on four-graded scales ‘Totally agree’ –‘Totally 
disagree’; index coded to vary between 0 and 1 (1=highest 
external efficacy; Cronbach’s alpha=0.77). 
1459 0.48 0.24 0.00 1.00 1.53 
Political trust How much do you trust each of the following actors? All 
responses 0–10 (10=complete trust). Index based on trust 
in Finnish President, Political parties, Parliament, Finnish 
Government and Politicians; coded to vary between 0 and 
1 (1 complete trust; Cronbach’s alpha=0.91). 
1587 0.63 0.17 0.00 1.00 1.30 
 
 
